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Ill
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Douglas E. Larsen's responsive argument provides
the court with references and case law which support the fact
that he identified reasons justifying set aside of the Default
Judgment in the lower court, that his claims are consistent with
Rule 60(b)(6) and (7), U.R.C.P., that his claim of accord and
satisfaction is valid and that defendant raised issues involving
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P., in the lower court.
IV
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT IDENTIFIED REASONS JUSTIFYING
SET ASIDE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
While plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to identify
any reason justifying relief from the Default Judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., such is not the case.

Mr. Larsen

specifically addressed those issues in the lower court under his
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief of Judgment
(Appellant's Brief - Exhibit " L " ) , Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Motion (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit " D " ) , and in his
Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Relief of Judgment (Exhibit " A " ) .
The fact that the parties settled this matter, that
defendant was denied proper service of process, that plaintiff
fraudulently altered the terms of payment, that plaintiff failed
to comply with Rule 58A(d), U.R.C.P., in regard to notice of

default, each constitute grounds for Rule 60(b) relief.

See Laub

v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass f n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982).
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS WERE CONSISTENT
WITH RULE 60(b) SUBSECTIONS (6) and (7).
Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the verbage contained
under Rule 60(b)(6), U.R.C.P., precludes defendant's claims.

In

fact, (b)(6) does apply, to-wit:
The judgment has been satisifed, released, or
discharged, or the prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application.
Final settlement, as reached and acknowledged by the
parties, justified the set aside of the Default Judgment.
Defendant would further point out that Mr. Larsen claimed
and established an undisputed lack of due process of law which
entitled him to relief from judgment under subdivision (b)(7) of
Rule 60, U.R.C.P., even after the expiration of three (3) months,
because a lack of due process is not expressly provided for by
this rule.

Ref. Bishfs Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21

(Utah 1961) .
POINT III
CLAIM OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
CONSTITUTES VALID ARGUMENT.
Plaintiff argues that satisfaction of the underlying debt
prior to commencement of the case does not constitute
satisfaction of the subsequent judgment obtained in regard to the
identical matter (Appelleefs Brief, page 3 ) . In other words,
plaintiff asserts that he is justified in collecting twice under
the same claim provided that he can effectively manipulate the

court and the parties.

Defendant disagrees.

Plaintiff's course

of improper conduct in this matter not only calls for set aside
of the Default Judgment, but for summary disposition of the
matter in defendant's favor.
It was held in Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
1369 (Utah 1980), that the issue of accord and satisfaction may
be raised seeking direct judicial sanction of satisfaction by
motion under Rule 60(b)(6), U.R.C.P.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT RAISED ISSUES IN THE LOWER
COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4(e), U.R.C.P.
Plaintiff's assertion that issues involving Rule 4(e),
U.R.C.P., were not raised in the lower court are incorrect.
Defendant raised these matters under Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Relief of
Judgment (Exhibit " A " ) , Defendant Larsen's Affidavit (Appellant's
Brief - Exhibit "D", paras. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 ) , as well as in
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief of
Judgment (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit "L", Point I ) , the
responsive Affidavit of Cary Draper (Appellant's Brief - Exhibit
" F " ) , further supports defendant's contentions in this regard.
In this instance, plaintiff has never disputed the failure of
proper service of Summons and Complaint pursuant to Rule 4(e),
U.R.C.P., as alleged by defendant.

In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d

288 Utah 1986), it was held that where judgment is void because
of a fatally defective service of process, the time limitations
under Rule 60(b) have no application.
P.2d 465 (Utah 1969).

See Woody v. Rhodes, 461

Given the facts of this matter, default

could be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) (3) and (4), as well
as (6) and (7), U.R.C.P.
The court held in Fibreboard Paper Prods, Corp. v. Dietrich,
475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970), that Default Judgment was properly set
aside where the trial court failed to obtain jurisdiction over
defendant for failure to properly issue Summons and Complaint.
V
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument and that contained in
Appellant's Brief, there is no question that defendant is
entitled to the granting of his appeal.

Defendant Larsen

respectfully requests the court to find that the Circuit Court
erred in failing to set aside the Default Judgment based upon the
existence of a prior settlement, that unilateral alteration of
the money order by plaintiff did not justify further litigation,
that plaintiff's subsequent failure to notice defendant of
actions taken pursuant to Rule 58A(d), U.R.C.P., justified
consideration for setting aside default and that failure of
proper service of Summons and Complaint justifies set aside of
default.
The Default Judgment as entered must also be set aside to
avoid the prospect of allowing the plaintiff to succeed in an
improper and wrongful attempt to collect twice under the same
claim.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to plaintiff/appellee's attorney, Mark T. Olson, 10 West
Broadway, Suite 725, Salt Lake City, Utah
of December, 1995.
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EXHIBIT "A"

DOUGLAS E. LARSEN
Defendant Pro-Se
1817 South Main Street, Suite 8
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: (801) 484-1344

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
N.A.R., LC.,

vs.

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFfS MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT

DOUG LARSEN,

Civil No.

Plaintiff,

940013590CV

Judge Phillip K. Palmer

Defendant.

Defendant Douglas E. Larsen hereby submits the following
reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Relief of Judgment.
MATERIAL FACTS
The following supplemental facts are submitted for the
consideration of the court, based upon plaintiff's response:
1.

The affidavit of Cary Draper confirms the fact that she

appeared at 1817 South Main Street for service of Summons and
Complaint and improperly issued those papers by pushing them
through a mail slot to "someone" behind a door.

(Ref. -

affidavit at para. 4.)
2.

Plaintiff acknowledges that "plaintiff crossed out the

restrictive language on the face of the money order" and cashed
it.

(Ref. - plaintiff's memo.)

3.

That plaintiff, having sent a third party to serve

Summons and Complaint at 1817 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on October 26, 1994, and acknowledging a telephone communication with Mr. Larsen's secretary at that address, later mailed
Notice of Default and Default Judgment to Mr. Larsen's former
address at 225 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December
7, 1994.
4.

(Exhibit "A". )
That plaintiff acknowledges that its mailing of Notice

of Default and Default Judgment, which were mailed to the incorre.ct address, were returned marked "forwarding order expired."
(Ref. - plaintiff's memo, in opposition.)
5.

That plaintiff subsequently served its Order in Supple-

mental Proceedings to defendant's correct 1817 South Main Street
address in April, 1995.
6.

That plaintiff failed to advise defendant of its action

in unilaterally modifying the demonination of full and final
payment on that document prior to cashing it or after, until m e
memorandum in opposition was submitted to the court on June 5,
1995.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Plaintiff's action in either knowingly and willfully or
erroneously forwarding Notice of Default and Default Judgment to
defendant's prior address of 225 South 200 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah, clearly and specifically violates Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

In admitting that its mailing was subse-

quently returned, marked "forwarding order expired", plaintiff
should have looked at the mailing address to verify its correct-

ness.

Failing that, plaintiff should have called defendant's

working telephone number that plaintiff had previously used, to
advise defendant.

As it stands, plaintiff proceeded with the

express knowledge that it failed to meet the requirement under
Rule 58A(d), and did nothing about it.

Plaintiff's actions also

violate Rule 4-504(2 ) (4 )(8) , Code of Judicial Administration in
regard to fundamental notice requirements.
POINT II
Plaintiff knowingly and willfully altered defendant's full
and final payment by crossing out the restrictive language contained on the money order, without defendant's express knowledge.
The money order, as forwarded by Mr. Larsen, constituted full and
final settlement of claim and plaintiff's action in modifying
that payment, cashing the check and then proceeding with the
complaint, all without noticing defendant, constitutes a pattern
of improper and deceitful conduct.
POINT III
Not only did plaintiff act to defendant's damage and detriment in secretly altering defendant's payment and failing to
notify him of that fact, plaintiff hid the fact that default was
entered until April, 1995, when the Order in Supplemental Proceedings was served at Mr. Larsen1s correct address.

Plaintiff,

with the knowledge that Rule 60(b)(l)(2)(3)(4), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides that a Motion for Relief from Judgment
must be entered within ninety (90) days of judgment, waited from
December 7, 1994, to April 14, 1995, to notice defendant of any
action having been taken in order to diminish his ability to
contest the matter.

POINT IV
Defendant agrees with the principal of accord and satisfaction in this matter in that, "The condition that if it is
accepted, it is to be in full satisfaction, and the condition
must be such that to whom the offer is made is bound to understand that if he accepts it, he does so subject to the conditions
imposed . . . the accord is the agreement and the satisfaction is
the execution or performance of such agreement . . .

Cannon v.

Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383 (1977).

The

money order, as delivered, was in full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim, plaintiff accepted it and executed payment by
cashing it, thereby acknowledging full and final acceptance.
Plaintiff's unilateral and secret modification of the terms and
conditions included does not legally alter discharge of the
claim.
POINT V
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that every
pleading, motion and other paper represented by an attorney
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading,
motion or paper, that to the best of his knowledge and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry is well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, delay or impose needless
increase in the cost of litigation.

As a businessman in this

community, defendant is aware that it has become a routine event
for attorneys, especially those affiliated with the collection
agencies, to act improperly, using the courts, to abuse the

public in the same fashion as plaintiff's counsel has proceeded
against him.

Not only has plaintiff and/or its attorney ignored

any fundamental rights under the law, they have proceeded in a
deceitful manner in doing so.

While defendant also understands

that the courts seldom issue sanctions under Rule 11, which would
go a long way to stopping attorney's wrongful use of the system
in order to protect fellow members of the Bar, Mr. Larsen asks
the court to consider Rule 11 sanctions at this time.

See Clark

v. Booth, 168 Utah Adv. Rep. (1991); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d
1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and applicable law, defendant
asks the court to grant defendant's Motion for Relief from
Judgment, and for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
DATED this

/^2

day of June, 1995.

DOUGLASS E. LARSEN
Defendant Pro Se
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF OF JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to
Mark T. Olson, Attorney for Plaintiff, 10 West Broadway, Suite
500, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, this

/Z.

day of June, 1995.

